Systematic reviews that include nonrandomized studies (NRS) face a number of logistical challenges. However, the greatest threat to the validity of such reviews arises from the differing susceptibility of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and NRS to selection bias. Groups compared in NRS are unlikely to be balanced because of the reasons leading study participants to adopt different health behaviours or to be treated differentially. Researchers can try to minimize the susceptibility of NRS to selection bias both at the design stage, for example, by matching participants on key prognostic factors, and during data analysis, for example, by regression modelling. However, because of logistical difficulties in matching, imperfect knowledge about the relationships between prognostic factors and between prognostic factors and outcome, and measurement limitations, it is inevitable that estimates of effect size derived from NRS will be confounded to some extent. Researchers, reviewers and users of evidence alike need to be aware of the consequences of residual confounding. In poor quality RCTs, selection bias tends to favour the new treatment being evaluated. Selection bias need not necessarily lead to systematic bias in favour of one treatment but, even if it acts in an unpredictable way, it will still give rise to additional, nonstatistical uncertainty bias around the estimate of effect size. Systematic reviews of NRS studies run the risk of compounding these biases. Nutritional choices and uptake of health education about nutrition are very likely to be associated with potential confounding factors. Therefore, pooled estimates of the effects of nutritional exposures and their confidence intervals are likely to be misleading; reviewers need to take into account both systematic and uncertainty bias.
Introduction
Systematic reviews that include evidence from nonrandomized studies (NRS) involve the usual steps (Alderson et al, 2004) : defining the question, writing a protocol, setting inclusion and exclusion criteria, designing an appropriate search strategy, extracting the data required, synthesizing available data in an appropriate manner and interpreting the overall evidence.
All of these steps pose greater challenges when NRS are included in a review than when a systematic review includes only randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Most of the challenges are logistical, in that reviews of NRS: consume more resources (more difficult to define search strategies, etc), require technically more skilled reviewers (with knowledge of all epidemiological designs, not just experimental ones) and involve more problematic and detailed data extraction.
There are also theoretical issues, which influence decisions about:
the types of study to include, the advantages and disadvantages of a comprehensive literature search, methods of data synthesis and interpretation of the evidence identified.
The validity of evidence from NRS is a fundamental concern MacLehose et al, 2000) and this paper will focus on this issue.
Reasons for reviewing evidence from NRS
It is widely accepted that high-quality RCTs provide the least biased evidence. However, RCTs are sometimes impossible or extremely difficult to conduct, typically because the outcome of interest is rare or occurs long after the intervention, or because the intervention cannot be randomized. Critics of evidence from RCTs also worry about the applicability of the effects that are observed because trials often recruit only a minority of people in the target population for the intervention.
These issues are all relevant to estimation of the effects of nutritional and dietary factors on health. For example, cancers associated with diet usually occur many years after the initial exposure and, from the point of view the sample size required to detect risks of a magnitude judged to have public health importance, have relatively low incidence. Particular dietary exposures are also usually difficult to randomize because people choose different diets. However, personal choices are not inevitably fixed-hence the importance of intervention studies (either observational or experimental) to evaluate the impact on behaviour and health outcome of public health initiatives to change behaviour, for example, to reduce the amount of saturated fats consumed. Such intervention studies may be targeted at individuals or communities.
The distinction between observational and intervention studies is very important. On casual reading, both types of studies may appear to compare health outcomes for people who are exposed or unexposed to particular factors, for example, a diet low in saturated fats. However, different study designs are usually employed to test different research questions and 'in only a minority of cases can the findings of observational epidemiological studies be compared to those from randomized trials' (Davey Smith, 2004) . In the example above, the former investigates the effects of choosing a low fat diet, whereas the latter investigates the effects of trying to persuade some people to change from a high to a low fat diet. The differences may be more complex than simply the need for intervention studies to effect behaviour change in order to compare exposed and unexposed groups. A low-fat diet of choice may differ in subtle ways from a low-fat diet achieved in response to advice to change one's diet; more obviously, the effects of vitamins obtained from food may differ from the effects of the same vitamins taken as supplements. Intervention and observational studies may also differ with respect to the duration of follow-up or the specific outcomes assessed (see above).
Thus, one should not necessarily expect observational and intervention studies to give the same answer. The focus of the Cochrane Collaboration is on intervention studies, that is, the extent to which it is possible to intervene, on the basis of high-quality evidence, to improve the health of people. This position is sometimes misunderstood because some review groups have included observational studies when reviewing the effects of an exposure that could be provided as a health-care intervention. For example, a Cochrane review (Siegfried et al, 2003) about the effect of circumcision on transmission of HIV includes mainly studies in which this association was observed, rather than studies in which men were circumcised with the objective of investigating the effect on HIV transmission. However, the review distinguishes carefully between studies carried out with different objectives and notes that RCTs of circumcision to prevent HIV transmission are ongoing.
Therefore, if RCTs do not exist, health-care decision makers may want to consider evidence from NRS about the effects of nutritional and dietary factors. However, the interpretation of the evidence is complex. First, the effects observed may be different from the effects achieved by an intervention that brings about apparently similar differences in exposure. Second, the effects may be biased, especially when assessing the intended, or primary effects of the exposure of interest (Meittinen, 1983) .
Sources of bias

Main sources of bias
The main sources of bias in all studies of the effects of interventions are (Alderson et al, 2004) as follows:
Selection bias:
Systematic differences in the characteristics of comparison groups. Performance bias: Systematic differences between comparison groups in the behaviour of participants or the care provided apart from the exposure or intervention being evaluated. Detection bias:
Systematic differences between comparison groups in the assessment of outcome(s).
Attrition bias:
Systematic differences between comparison groups in withdrawal from the study.
These biases apply to cohort studies. (The term cohort study is used here loosely to include all comparisons between groups of exposed and unexposed participants, that is, true observational studies, controlled clinical trials, nonrandomized trials, RCTs, etc) Similar biases affect case-control studies but, with the exception of selection bias, the above definitions cannot be applied in a straightforward manner. Health behaviours of participants (cases and controls) may covary with the exposure of interest (cf performance bias) and this can bias the findings if the exposure of interest differs (as hypothesized) between cases and controls. The assessment of exposure (and other confounding factors) in case-control studies is susceptible to bias (cf detection bias). Since case-control studies are usually retrospective, attrition bias may be best conceptualized as the proportion of nonresponders among sampled cases and controls.
Sources of bias in different study designs Performance bias, detection bias and attrition bias can affect RCTs as well as NRS (see comments above about case-control studies), although RCTs are usually less susceptible to these biases than NRS. In intervention studies, 'intention-to-treat' and blinding are examples of design features to protect against bias. These features are rarely included in observational studies, even when it is possible to do so. Therefore, NRS are likely to be more susceptible to performance and detection biases than RCTs (see Table 1 ).
Since selection bias is a specific problem of NRS, and is a particular concern when interpreting their validity, the latter bias will be considered more closely below. People who make healthy or risky decisions about health behaviours of interest, for example, nutritional choices, are likely to make similar healthy or risky decisions about other health and lifestyle behaviours, for example, smoking, alcohol, exercise and sexual behaviour. These other behaviours may be associated with the health outcomes of interest, meeting the criteria for confounding, that is, factors associated with both the exposure and outcomes of interest.
Selection bias
The health behaviours that people choose are also likely to be associated with their other characteristics. Buying food with high nutritional value is usually more expensive than buying less healthy food, so healthy eaters are likely to have higher incomes than unhealthy eaters. Buying healthy food also depends on knowing which food items are healthy, so healthy eaters are likely to have had a better education. It is highly plausible that income and education, through other behaviours, are associated with health outcomes, again meeting the criteria for confounding, that is, factors associated with both exposure and outcome.
Ways of minimizing systematic bias from confounding
Inferring causal relationships from observational associations requires researchers to consider a range of criteria (Hill, 1965) , including the extent to which confounding might afford an alternative explanation for the effects observed. Epidemiologists have a range of tools available to minimize confounding when designing and analysing observational studies.
Minimizing confounding at the design stage Confounding can be reduced at the design stage by matching comparison groups. This approach is only feasible on a limited number of prognostic factors or covariates and is rarely perfect. Therefore, when matching is carried out, there will be 'residual confounding' from:
systematic differences between imperfectly matched groups; known prognostic factors that are not matched and unknown prognostic factors that are not observed.
(Stratification of allocation and minimization, other ways of reducing imbalance in prognostic factors between comparison groups at the design stage, are only meaningful in the context of an RCT.)
Minimizing confounding at the analysis stage Stratification of analyses. Stratification during analysis is only possible on a limited number of prognostic factors or covariates and depends on the amount of available data/ outcome events. Consequently, the resolution of the strata is limited. The usual practice of pooling effects across strata also assumes no effect modification or interaction. (Such analyses have low power to test for interactions.) Therefore, when stratification is used as a strategy for minimizing confounding, there is residual confounding from: systematic differences within strata; interactions not taken into account; known prognostic factors that are not stratified and unknown prognostic factors that are not observed.
Regression modelling. Adjustment for confounding by regression modelling depends on the method of modelling of covariates (eg choices for fitting continuous variables, including dichotomization; grouping into multiple categories; assuming a linear relationship; assuming a quadratic relationship; etc). It is limited by the precision of measurement of the confounding factors, as well as by the numbers of factors that can be modelled (as for stratification, dependent on the number of events observed). Interactions are rarely considered and there is a tendency to prefer parsimonious, simple models. Therefore, when regression modelling is used as a strategy for minimizing confounding, there is residual confounding from: Propensity scores. Adjustment using propensity scores generally uses regression techniques but, first, models factors associated with participants receiving one or other intervention (or being exposed/unexposed). It is argued that this method has technical advantages over multivariable regression (D'Agostino, 1998). However, it still assumes adequate characterization of allocation, for example, is not immune to confounding, and is limited by similar assumptions to multivariable regression modelling. Therefore, when propensity scoring is used as a strategy for minimizing confounding, there is residual confounding from: imperfect knowledge of appropriate characterization of associations (including interactions); imprecise measurements and unknown prognostic factors that are not observed.
In summary, if confounding is present, whatever methods are used to adjust the results of a study, some residual confounding is inevitable because: methods of adjusting for confounding, for example, stratification or regression modelling, are imperfect; confounding factors are subject to measurement error and some confounding may arise from unknown or unmeasured prognostic factors.
Consequences of residual confounding
Systematic bias from confounding Confounding by health behaviours or socioeconomic characteristics is likely to cause systematic bias in a predictable direction. Findings that are incompletely adjusted (ie affected by 'residual confounding') will tend to exaggerate the strength of association between the factor of interest and outcome if one or more prognostic characteristic is also positively associated with the factor. For example, people who take antioxidant vitamins may have better health outcomes than those who do not because they exercise more, or eat more healthy food. The true causal effects of supplementation with antioxidant vitamins can only be assessed in RCTs (Heart Protection Study Collaborative Group, 2002). If confounding causes systematic bias, the answer from a nonrandomized study will be misleading because it will (usually) overestimate the true benefit of the intervention of interest compared to the control intervention. The bias is not reflected in the confidence interval (CI) for the estimate, since the interval is centred on the wrong estimate.
Uncertainty bias from confounding Section 'Ways of minimizing systematic bias from confounding' implies that all NRS are confounded to a greater or lesser extent. Although NRS typically report estimates and CIs for effects in the usual way, these statistics assume that there are no systematic differences between the groups being compared. This assumption is a condition of standard hypothesis testing, but is unrealistic when applied to NRS (Greenland, 2004) .
Even when systematic bias from confounding is judged to be unlikely, residual confounding will cause uncertainty bias. Imperfect knowledge about associations between confounding factors, between confounding factors and outcome, and the possibility of unknown confounding factors means that one cannot be sure in which direction residual confounding acts. The implication is that the estimate is more uncertain than indicated by the CI. The extent to which the above problems affect a particular study is unknown, so the extent of uncertainty bias is also unknown.
Uncertainty bias follows logically (and inevitably) from acceptance of residual confounding; as noted above, the question is not whether residual confounding is present in NRS but to what extent. It can be difficult to conceptualize uncertainty bias in the context of a single NRS, but Deeks et al (2003) illustrated the problem by simulation studies using Monte Carlo and bootstrap methods, based on data sets collected for two large international multicentre RCTs.
The two data sets were from (a) the International Stroke Trial (outcome: death within 14 days, death or dependency after 6 or 12 days; 14 geographic regions) and (b) the European Carotid Surgery Trial (outcome: death or major stroke; eight geographic regions). Deeks et al created many 'mini'-RCTs and 'mini'-NRS (historically controlled studies and concurrently controlled studies) of the same size by repeated sampling from these two data sets (see Tables 2  and 3 ). The additional uncertainty was represented by the overdispersion of the mini-NRS estimates compared to the mini-RCT estimates, reported as the ratio of the standard deviations of the log odds ratios (s.d.(ln OR) in Table 4 ). Table 2 Simulation of historically controlled and concurrently (geographically) controlled studies; division of trial data sets by time of recruitment, intervention and control group and centre for sampling for simulation studies First 50% of patients recruited (T 1 ) Second 50% of patients recruited (T 2 )
Control (C) Etc Deeks et al (2003) pointed out that the size of the uncertainty bias is an attribute of the data set, and that it is therefore independent of sample size. Since statistical precision increases with increasing sample size, the relative importance of uncertainty bias (ie the extent to which the true uncertainty around the point estimate is underestimated by the CI) increases with sample size (Greenland, 2004) . The authors stated that for large study populations, 95% CIs can easily be five to 10 times too narrow.
In addition, Deeks et al (2003) investigated whether systematic bias and uncertainty biases are reduced by standard methods of case-mix adjustment. The authors programmed adjustment for key prognostic factors for each sample using (a) stratification, (b) logistic regression and (c) propensity scores. They found that, on average, biases were not reduced by any method and adjustment by logistic regression tended to increase bias.
Evidence of bias in NRS
Evidence of bias in poor quality RCTs A systematic review of the effects of the quality of RCTs of health-care interventions concluded that inadequate or unclear concealment of randomization (making the affected RCTs susceptible to selection bias) was associated with a 30% (95% CI 20-38%) exaggeration of effect (Juni et al, 2001 ).
This implies that practioner researchers tend to subvert randomization by selecting patients for the new treatment who are more likely to have good outcomes.
Controlled trials that are not randomized properly are, in effect, nonrandomized trials.
Paradoxically, given standard hierarchies of the 'strength of evidence', researchers may be more biased, or have greater opportunity to introduce bias, in nonrandomized trials than in truly observational studies. In practice, it can be difficult to classify different nonrandomized study designs as controlled trials or observational studies and methodological research is urgently needed to identify the features of studies that are associated with both systematic and uncertainty bias.
Comparisons of findings from RCTs and NRS of the same research question
Comparisons of findings from RCTs and NRS of the same research question provide another way to investigate bias in NRS. Such studies have frequently reported discrepancies by study design, but fair comparisons are very difficult to make (MacLehose et al, 2000; Deeks et al, 2003) . There are at least three reasons for this:
RCTs and NRS of precisely the same question are rare; for example, studies of the same intervention using different study designs usually differ systematically with respect to the population, intervention or outcome. RCTs and NRS may differ systematically in other ways, for example, date of publication, susceptibility to bias. When RCTs and NRS of precisely the same question do exist, NRS are usually of relatively poor quality (because an NRS is, arguably, a clearly suboptimal choice when an RCT is possible); therefore, even in this circumstance, the comparison is not fair. Deeks et al (2003) reviewed methodological systematic reviews that have compared findings from RCTs and NRS of the same research question. The conclusions of the eight different reviews varied: 5/8: differences between effects estimated by RCTs and NRS for many but not all interventions, no consistent pattern; 1/8: overestimation of effect (benefit) for all interventions studied and Table 3 Simulation of historically controlled and concurrently (geographically) controlled studies; comparisons between trial subgroups (see Table 2 ) sampled for simulation studies Simulation of historically controlled studies Simulation of concurrently (geographically) controlled studies
Centre In the RCT vs CCS comparison, the average OR for mini-CCS was 'constrained' to be approximately the same as for mini-RCTs because intervention and control participants were sampled from all regions about the same number of times.
2/8: effects estimated by RCTs and NRS were 'remarkably similar'.
It is important to remember that both the publication of primary studies and the selection of primary studies by reviewers may be biased. There is also the possibility of bias in interpretation of the review findings by reviewers. The findings of the latter 2/8 reviews could have been the same as for the first 5/8 if, in the latter 2/8 reviews, the reviewers were less critical of the discrepancies they observed between effects estimated by RCTs and NRS.
Cautionary tales
Examples of interventions for which RCTs and NRS give dramatically different results are worthy of attention since they highlight the extent to which health-care decision makers might be misled by reviews of NRS when RCTs are not available. Conflicting evidence about the effects of antioxidant vitamins has been mentioned above. Findings from studies of b carotene are particularly worrying. Reviews of observational studies provided convincing evidence of a protective effect against cardiovascular disease (Jha et al, 1995) . Egger and colleagues subsequently reviewed RCTs of b carotene supplementation on cardiovascular disease and observed a significantly increased risk of mortality . They also noted that there were similar discrepant results for the effects of b carotene on cancer (Caraballoso et al, 2003) .
One of the best documented and carefully examined discrepancies concerns the effect of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) on the risk of coronary heart disease (CHD) in postmenopausal women. A review of high-quality observational studies, recently reprinted, concluded that HRT had a protective (relative risk 0.56), which was 'unlikely to be explained by confounding factors' (Stampfer & Colditz, 1991) . In the observational studies, this was an unintended effect of HRT, but the evidence led to the use of HRT being promoted for the prevention of CHD (Barrett-Connor, 2004) and to RCTs to test the effect experimentally. Over 10 y later, evidence from these RCTs has contradicted the observational evidence, finding if anything that HRT may result in an early excess risk of CHD (Beral et al, 2002) . Interestingly, recent commentaries of experts on why the discrepancy arose (alongside republication of the original review of observational studies) do not agree, tracing the problem variously to differences in the populations studied (Stampfer, 2004) , confounding by clinical indication (baseline risk of CHD) (Vandenbroucke, 2004) , socioeconomic status or other factors (Barrett-Connor, 2004; Kuller, 2004) . Petitti (2004) draws four lessons from the example as follows: (a) do not ignore evidence of contradiction (of the observational findings); (b) do not be seduced by plausible mechanisms; (c) suspend belief, that is, remain critical and alert to alternative explanations for findings; and (d) maintain scepticism-wise lessons indeed.
This cautionary tale has an epilogue. HRT has effects on other long-term, unintended health outcomes, for example, breast, endometrial and colon cancer, stroke and femoral fracture. The effects observed in RCTs and observational studies on some of the outcomes are the same; for others, the effects are different and not always in the same direction (Beral et al, 1999 (Beral et al, , 2002 Meade & Vickers, 1999) .
Discussion
This paper has tried to highlight threats to the validity of systematic reviews of NRS. Systematically reviewing observational evidence about the effects of health-care interventions and exposures may still be worthwhile, but the crucial issue is how the review is used. Increasing evidence suggests that the quantitative effects (and the associated CIs) observed in primary NRS, and reviews of NRS, should be interpreted with extreme caution. Primary effects are particularly likely to be misleading. The HRT example also shows that, even with '20-20 hindsight', experts disagree about why the discrepancies arose.
Systematic reviews of NRS may be helpful in three situations: (a) To underpin the case for doing an RCT by providing an explicit evaluation of the weaknesses of available NRS, and to inform the design of a subsequent RCT (Taggart et al, 2001; Siegfried et al, 2003) . (b) To provide evidence of the effects (benefit or harm) of exposures or interventions that cannot be randomized, or which are extremely unlikely to be studied in RCTs (Black, 1996) . (c) To provide evidence of specific outcomes (benefit or harm) that cannot be adequately studied in RCTs such as long-term and rare outcomes.
There is a danger that the second situation described above can be used to justify a systematic review of NRS of many interventions. However, the emphasis in such reviews needs to be on presenting a disinterested synthesis (which is unlikely to be quantitative) that systematically reports the findings and limitations of available NRS. The description also implies that these reviews should only be carried out when RCTs are not available.
The third situation described above is based on the view that observational studies of unintended effects are less likely to be biased (Vandenbroucke, 2004) , as well as on the likely absence of evidence from RCTs for logistical reasons. However, the range of discrepancies for different unintended effects in the HRT example should be a warning to reviewers that unintended effects may also be susceptible to selection bias and confounding.
The use of observational evidence to provide the impetus to do RCTs is probably the best justification for a systematic review of NRS. Consider a question such as the effects of 'five (helpings of fruit and vegetables) a day'. There are good reasons to suspect that observational studies will be susceptible to selection bias and residual confounding. Evidence from NRS of benefit of a five-a-day diet is unlikely to be sufficient to promote this change in diet as an evidence-based policy. It is surely important to answer the pragmatic question about whether interventions to promote the diet are effective, since such a policy would consume public resources that could be invested elsewhere. This pragmatic question could be investigated by carrying out a large cluster-RCT. Given well-documented difficulties in bringing about behaviour change, one would not expect the same effect as in those who are already compliant with the diet.
A final consideration is the difficulty of doing systematic reviews of NRS. The resources available for reviewing (both financial and other, for example, the time of volunteers who often carry out reviews) are scarce. Systematic reviews of NRS are very likely to consume more resources, but provide less valuable evidence. There will always be exceptions to this generalization since the value of a review depends on the priority of a research question and the context in which new evidence will be used. For example, evidence from NRS of a serious adverse effect of an intervention would be acted on in different ways (have different 'value'), depending on the associated benefits of the intervention and alternative interventions that might be available. Nevertheless, the 'cost-effectiveness' principle is one that reviewers should consider carefully.
